Providing distributed certificate authority service in mobile ad hoc networks by Hui, LCK et al.
Title Providing distributed certificate authority service in mobile adhoc networks
Author(s) Dong, Y; Go, HW; Sui, AF; Li, VOK; Hui, LCK; Yiu, SM
Citation
Proceedings - First International Conference On Security And
Privacy For Emerging Areas In Communications Networks,
Securecomm 2005, 2005, v. 2005, p. 149-156
Issued Date 2005
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/45868
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
Abstract — In this paper, we propose an architecture for 
providing distributed Certificate Authority (CA) service 
in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET), based on 
threshold cryptography. We have two major 
contributions: 1) we make use of the cluster structure to 
provide CA service, and design a scheme for locating 
CA server nodes in MANET; 2) we provide a proactive 
secret share update protocol, which periodically updates 
CA secret shares with low system overhead. Compared 
with existing approaches, our CA architecture provides 
faster CA services to user nodes at reduced system 
overhead.
Index Terms —Mobile ad hoc network, PKI, 
threshold secret sharing, cluster-based architecture,
proactive update, distributed CA services. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
MOBILE Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a self-
organized wireless network without 
infrastructure. With the increasing popularity of 
MANET, its security issue has drawn greater 
attention.  
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [8] is a widely 
used security mechanism in communication networks. 
In PKI, each entity has a public and private key pair. 
There is a trusted-by-all centralized authority, called 
Certificate Authority (CA), for key management. The 
CA has a public and private key pair, and signs public 
key certificate (PKC) for each user’s public key using 
its private key. The PKC signed by the CA can then 
be used as a validity proof for the public key of the 
user. The CA is also responsible for PKC update or 
renewal, and revocation.  
PKI has been considered as the foundation of 
security services in MANET, since it is efficient in 
key management and distribution, and is convenient to 
achieve authentication and no-repudiation. However, 
there are challenges to implement PKI in MANET. 
The conventional single-CA architecture in PKI will 
obviously suffer the single point of failure problem. 
Further, in the mobile environment of MANET, how 
to locate the CA is a non-trial issue, which may 
involve much communication overhead.   
In [1], a decentralized CA method is proposed to 
solve the single point of failure problem, which 
distributes the functionality of a single CA to a set of 
nodes by secret sharing and threshold cryptography. 
Then any CA service has to be performed jointly by t
CA nodes, where t  is called the threshold of the 
secret sharing. In this way, even if an attacker has 
discovered the secret shares of more than one but less 
than t  CA nodes, the attacker still cannot recover 
CA’s secret key. However, the above threshold secret 
sharing scheme still fails when the shares of more than 
t  CA nodes have been discovered by the intruders 
over a sufficiently long period. To enhance security, 
schemes using proactive share update [2], [9]-[11] has 
been proposed [1], in which a new set of shares are 
computed after a certain time interval. Therefore, an 
attacker has to complete the attack within this interval; 
otherwise all efforts are in vain after the shares 
change.  
There are still unsolved issues with this distributed 
CA and proactive update scheme. First, the CA 
locating problem becomes aggravated, since a user 
node has to find t  CA server nodes, much more 
difficult than finding one. Schemes such as flooding 
[7] are not viable since it will consume too much 
network resource. Second, efficient update of the 
secret shares in all CA nodes is not trivial. Although a 
scalable update scheme has been proposed in [5], it 
assumes every node is a CA and each node has at least 
t  neighbors, which are unrealistic in MANET. 
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Although the CA location problem is solved by this 
approach, attackers are also alleviated with the 
concerns on which node to attack: they can attack any 
more than t  nodes since every node is a CA.  
In this paper, we have two contributions in 
resolving the above issues. First, we propose a 
clustering architecture for the organization of 
MANET, in which nodes are grouped into clusters. 
Each cluster has a cluster head (CH), through which 
CA server can be quickly located. Second, we devise a 
distributed secret share update scheme utilizing the 
sequential share update scheme proposed in [5]. By 
utilizing the information at CHs, secret shares can be 
quickly updated. From analysis and simulation, we 
show that our approach is able to achieve good service 
availability and quick CA response time, at reasonable 
communication overhead. Further, since the CAs in 
our scheme is confined to a subset of the total node 
population, the system security is enhanced compared 
to the case when all nodes have a secrete share [5].  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we describe the system architecture. 
Section 3 presents the PKC scheme. Section 4 shows 
the details of the CA share update process. Analysis 
and discussions are presented in Section 5. Simulation 
results are provided in Section 6. Conclusion is given 
in Section 7.  
2. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
We consider a mobile ad hoc network with N  nodes, 
structured into clusters. In this paper, we do not 
specify any rules for cluster formation, since it is a 
separate issue and has been treated in work such as 
[6]. At the inception of the network, we assume that n
CA nodes have been selected.  
We select a cluster head (CH) for each cluster, 
based on the following rules: 1) when there is at least 
one CA node in the cluster, the CH has to be a CA; 2) 
when there is more than one CA in the cluster, the CA 
node with the smallest ID is chosen as CH; 3) when 
there is no CA in the cluster, an arbitrary node can be 
CH. Specifically, for a CH satisfying rule 3), the CH 
is only delegated to managing and distributing CA 
information, but will not participate in the CA share 
update stage. Therefore, in later discussions on share 
update, the participating CHs have to be selected 
based on rules 1) and 2).  
When a user first joins the network, we assume it 
has been authenticated [4]. With this authentication, 
the user will approach the CA server nodes for issuing 
a digital PKC. 
We assume an attacker can only obtain the secret 
share possessed by a CA node by observing the 
signatures signed by the CA. However, the attacker 
cannot hack into any CA node. Thus, if the secret 
share is changed, the attacker will not automatically 
obtain the new share. We also assume the information 
exchange between CAs is secured by the CA 
signatures.  
3. SCHEME FOR PROVIDING PKC SERVICE
In this paper, we consider the problem of how a user 
can obtain the PKC after joining the network. We 
adopt the ( , )t n  threshold scheme for the issuing and 
renewal of the PKC. In such a scheme, t  out of n  CA 
nodes are selected for the joint signing of the PKC. 
Therefore, for a user to obtain a PKC, it is equivalent 
to finding at least t  CA servers for the certificate 
service.  
A.CH-Assisted CA Locating Scheme 
We devise a cluster-based scheme for locating CAs. 
The notations used in our scheme are summarized in 
Table 1.
t Threshold 
iCH cluster head of cluster i
iU user in cluster i
iN the number of CA nodes in cluster i
( , )B i j the number of CA nodes in 'sineighboring cluster j
 Table 1: Notation of CH-assisted CA locating scheme
In our scheme, each CH maintains a CA 
information table (CIT), which contains a list of the 
CA nodes in its local cluster, and probably the CA 
information in other clusters. The procedure of 
locating CAs is as follows.
1. When iU  wants to locate at least t  CAs, it sends 
a request to iCH  CA Information (CI). 
2. iCH  collects CA distribution information, and 
passes it to iU  (to be explained below). 
3. iU  selects t  CA server nodes according to CI 
provided by iCH , and sends renew request 
RENEW_REQ or new certificate request 
NEW_REQ messages to CAs. iU  either specifies 
the set of signer by passing the selected CA server 
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list to each one, or does not specify the set by 
using dynamic coalescing scheme proposed in [5].  
4. iCH  combines the responding t  partial 
signatures to generate the complete signature.  
In Step 2, there are several possibilities when 
iCH  collects CI.  
1) When iN t≥ , there are enough CA in cluster i
for CA service. Therefore, the CI sent to iU  contains 
the IDs of the CA nodes in the cluster.  
2) When iN t< , there are not enough CA in 
cluster i . In this case, CA in other clusters will have 
to be used. We require iCH  should periodically 
request its neighboring CHs to provide the number of 
CA in their own clusters. The interval of such a 
request is directly determined by the topology 
dynamics in a neighboring cluster. We further 
consider two sub-cases.  
Case a) ( , )i
j
N B i j t+ ≥? , i.e., there are enough 
CAs in cluster i  plus its direct neighboring clusters. 
Then iCH  records in the CIT both the CA ID in 
cluster i  and ( , )B i j . It is up to the user to contact the 
CH of a direct neighboring cluster for CA ID.  
Case b) ( , )i
j
N B i j t+ <? , i.e., the number of CAs in 
both cluster i  and its direct neighbors is not enough 
for the CA service. Upon receiving a user request, 
iCH  will send a request message to all other CHs, and 
each CH receiving the request message responds with 
a message indicating the number of CA in its cluster. 
This can be viewed as flooding within the CHs. It is 
obvious that the overhead is constrained when 
compared to the conventional flooding method.  
Since the CA information could be piggybacked 
with the cluster management information (such as 
routing packets, cluster membership exchange, etc.), 
communication overhead can be correspondingly 
reduced, as discussed in Section 5.  
4. CA SHARED SECRET UPDATE
A.Scheme Overview 
In our scheme, the CA services need to be performed 
by at least t  server nodes. This alleviates the problem 
of single point of failure. To further enhance security, 
we require the shared secrets are updated periodically, 
as proposed in [5].  
In this paper, we make use of the idea of 
sequential update proposed in [5]. However, this 
scheme is designed for share updates within one-hop 
neighborhood. For our cluster-based system, the 
scheme in [5] cannot be directly applied without 
modification. In this section, we propose a secret 
share update scheme for our cluster-based system. The 
process is composed of three phases: 1) update 
initialization; 2) update procedure; 3) update 
propagation. In the following we describe the details 
of the three phases. 
B.Share Update Scheme 
1)Phase One 
We assume the MANET is coarsely synchronized 
among all the CAs. By “coarsely”, we mean the CA 
clocks are within the accuracy of seconds (or even 
sub-seconds) relative to the “true” time. This 
assumption is reasonable in MANET [13]. All CAs 
maintain an update schedule, which specifies the time 
at which a share update should start.  
At the inception of the update, at least t  CAs 
should participate in the derivation of new secret 
shares, which is called new share initialization. It is 
after the initialization that the shares on other CAs can 
be updated based on this initial group of shares. 
Obviously, it is necessary to have one and only one 
initialization; otherwise the system will have multiple 
initial share groups, which will eventually lead to 
conflicts during the update process.  
Thus, the goal of phase one (update initialization) 
is to ensure that there is indeed one initialization node 
group within the whole system. It is equivalent to 
finding one CA node, which will form a group with 
(no less than) t  CA server nodes. To achieve the 
above design goal, we adopt the following measures.  
A) We require that only a CA-CH node (a CA 
node that is also a CH) should be eligible as an 
initiator, in order to narrow the field of competition. 
To initialize the update, a CA-CH node will broadcast 
an initialization message to all other CA-CHs. This 
message contains the update request, and the ID of the 
sending CA-CH.  
B) We adopt a random backoff scheme to further 
reduce the probability of multiple initializations. More 
specifically, a CA-CH will only broadcast the 
initialization message after a random backoff period.  
The length of random backoff period is 
determined as follows. For a CA-CH node iCH , it 
will choose in a uniform manner an integer iW  from 
the range [ ]0, iCW , where iCW  is the contention 
window size. Then the node enters the backoff state, 
and waits for i dW T×  seconds before broadcasting the 
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initialization message, where dT  is the time slot size 
common to all CA-CHs.  
During the backoff period, iCH  will monitor the 
received messages. If it receives any initialization 
messages from other CA-CHs, the backoff state is 
aborted, and the node prepares for share update. After 
the completion of the backoff period, if the node 
receives no initialization messages, the node sends an 
initialization message, which is to be flooded among 
all CA-CHs. Since the flooding is only confined in 
CA-CHs, the involved overhead is constrained, even 
for large MANETs. Since different CA-CHs may 
choose different iW  values, it is likely that such a 
difference in backoff period will prevent many CA-
CH nodes from transmitting initialization message.  
The backoff period is determined by two 
parameters, dT  and iCW . The selection of an 
appropriate dT  should be related to the largest 
propagation delay among CA-CHs within the 
MANET. For example, dT  can be chosen as the 
longest propagation delay between any two CA-CHs. 
In this way, any two CA-CHs node who choose iW
differing by 1 can avoid collision of initialization 
messages.  
The selection of iCW  is dictated by the number of 
CA-CHs. A small iCW  increases the chance of 
collision, but a large iCW  prolongs the backoff time. 
An appropriate choice for iCW  is the number of CA-
CH nodes. Since we require that at least t  CA server 
nodes participate in the derivation of the new shares, it 
is desirable to prioritize the CA-CH nodes that have 
enough CA in its cluster, or at least in neighboring 
clusters. Generally, we can divide the contention 
window (CW) size into three categories. The first 
category, corresponding to CA-CH nodes having more 
than t  CA nodes in the cluster, is assigned a small 
CW value, denoted as CW_1; for CA-CH nodes that 
have less than t  CA nodes in the cluster, but more 
than t  CA nodes plus the CA nodes in direct 
neighboring cluster, we assign a larger CW valued, 
denoted as CW_2; for the remaining CA-CH nodes 
(less than t  CA nodes after counting direct 
neighboring clusters), we assign the largest CW value, 
CW_3. In this way, CA-CHs with more CA nodes in 
the vicinity have a higher chance of winning the 
competition.  
C) Although the probability of collision can be 
lowered after the above two measures, it is still 
possible for multiple initializations to happen. Here 
we present the collision resolution method.  
After a CA-CH node receives the initialization 
message, it sends an acknowledgement (ACK) to the 
sender. It is possible that a node (including a node that 
has sent an initialization message) will receive another 
initialization message afterwards. In this case, the 
node will compare the ID contained in the two 
messages. If the newer one has a smaller ID, the node 
will send an ACK to the new sender, and a negative 
acknowledgement (NACK) to the previous sender; if 
the newer one has a larger ID, the node will only 
transmit a NACK to the new sender. We require an 
initializing CA-CH node to collect ACKs from all 
CA-CHs before it can claim itself as the winner of the 
competition. Here we assume that each CA-CH has a 
complete list of CA-CHs in the network. Whenever 
there are multiple initializing nodes, the conflict will 
eventually be resolved, since only the initializing node 
with the smallest ID can be the sole winner.  
2)Phase Two 
After phase one, the winning CA-CH node, 
denoted as CA-CHW , is to find (at least) t  CA nodes 
to derive the new shares. This CA locating procedure 
is identical to the scheme described in Section 3, and 
will not be repeated here.  
3)Phase Three 
After phase two, at least t  servers have updated 
their shares. Then the t  updated servers will update 
the remaining CA nodes in the network. The goal of 
phase three is to propagate the share update to all the 
CA. When a CA finishes the share update process, it 
will inform its CH about update completion. The 
CH(s) collect update completion information from its 
local cluster, and inform the neighboring CHs that has 
not updated about the completion of the update. Then 
the informed CHs request the CA nodes in its cluster 
to update. The CAs will then contact the CHs to locate 
t  CAs with new shares, which can be based on the 
locating method described previously.  
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the CA 
locating scheme and discuss the share update scheme. 
A.Analysis on CH-assisted CA Locating Scheme 
1)System Response Time 
We define the system response time as the interval 
from the moment when a user starts seeking CA 
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service until the time when CA service is completed 
by the CA server nodes. When comparing the system 
response time of our scheme with other schemes, such 
as the flooding scheme in [7], the major difference in 
system response time lies in the time needed for a user 
to locate enough CA server nodes, which is called CA 
server locating delay (CSLD). We now analyze the 
CSLD in our scheme.  
It is obvious that our CH-assisted CA locating 
scheme shifts the responsibility of CA discovery from 
each user node to CHs. According to our scheme, a 
user node only needs to contact the CH for the CA 
information table (CIT). As presented in Section 3, 
there are three possibilities on the CH reply, namely 
(see Section 3-B for the details): Case 1), when 
iN t≥ ; Case 2-a), when ( , )i
j
N B i j t+ ≥? ; Case 2-
b), when ( , )i
j
N B i j t+ <? . For all cases, after 
obtaining the CIT, the user’s job is extremely simple: 
contact CAs in the cluster and/or CHs of other clusters 
as instructed by the CIT.  
In Case 1), the user can immediately contact CA 
nodes within the cluster after receiving the CIT. Thus, 
the locating delay is just the response delay of the CH, 
and the system response time is mostly the time for 
CA server nodes to perform the CA service.  
In Case 2-a), the user node needs to contact CA 
server nodes in neighboring clusters. Note that we 
have two approaches to maintain the CIT (see Section 
3-B): the first one is to record the CA IDs of a 
neighbor cluster in the CIT, and the second one is to 
only record the number of CA nodes in that cluster. 
For the first approach, the delay is essentially the 
same as Case 1); for the second approach, the delay is 
a little, but not much, longer since the user node only 
has to communicate with several neighboring CHs to 
obtain the CA IDs.  
In Case 2-b), since there are not enough CA in the 
vicinity of the requesting user, the CH has to collect 
the CA information from the remote area by 
broadcasting requests to all the CHs in the network. 
The CH can reply to the requesting user once the 
received responses consist of enough number of CA, 
instead of waiting for all the responses from all CHs. 
Thus, the locating delay is mainly determined by the 
response delay from other CHs, which should be quite 
limited.  
When compared to the flooding scheme [7], the 
locating delay is almost negligible for Case 1) and 
Case 2-a) in our scheme; even for Case 2-b), the 
locating delay is still limited.  
Above all, the system response time is greatly 
shortened, which is a salient advantage for our 
scheme.  
2)System Overhead 
In our scheme, a CH is required to maintain CA 
ID within the cluster. Since this work can be viewed 
as part of the job for monitoring the cluster 
membership, there is no system overhead from a CA 
service perspective. Therefore, we only have two 
sources of system overhead.  
Firstly, the CH needs to periodically exchange CA 
information with the direct neighbors in both Case 2-
a) and 2-b). However, in cluster management, 
information exchange (such as routing, cluster 
membership change, etc.) is frequent between 
neighboring CHs. Therefore, the CA information 
exchange can be piggybacked with other cluster 
management information. In this way, the extra 
system overhead is negligible.  
Secondly, a CH needs to flood other CHs for CA 
information in Case 2-b) when receiving a user 
service request, during which a certain amount of 
overhead will occur. However, the overhead is much 
reduced when compared to other approaches. Further, 
we can also avoid the occurrence of such an 
undesirable situation by merging clusters with few 
CAs; by this means, most of CA services can be 
obtained within the vicinity. Another method is that 
the CH only chooses to probe a subset of CHs, e.g., 
the relatively closer CHs, for future report, after the 
initial flooding. This approach is better when the 
frequency of user CA service request is higher and the 
mobility of the nodes is slower.     
Overall, our cluster-based approach is able to 
provide prompt system response while reducing 
system overhead to a minimum. Thus, our approach is 
particularly suitable for large MANET, which could 
be otherwise difficult to manage with the conventional 
methods.  
B.Discussions on CA Share Update Scheme 
Our share update scheme exhibits two desirable 
characteristics.  
The first is that we guarantee there is only one 
initialization CA node within the whole MANET. 
This is achieved by: 1) random backoff to minimize 
the collision probability; 2) collision resolution by 
prioritizing the node with the smallest ID. The share 
update scheme presented in [5] does not consider such 
an issue, and will thus suffer from the problem of 
multiple initializations.  
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The second feature of our scheme is that we 
utilize CH-assisted CA locating scheme for CA share 
update and propagation. Such an approach simplifies 
the implementation complexity, since functions for 
CA locating can be re-used. Further, our scheme 
provides an orderly update procedure, as it propagates 
from one cluster to another. Correspondingly, the 
update process is also speeded up.  
C. Discussions on Security  
In [5], the secret shares are distributed to all nodes in 
the network, instead of to a subset of selected nodes as 
in paper [1]. The problem of locating CA nodes is 
solved, since a node requesting CA service only needs 
to find more than t  neighboring nodes. However, this 
approach greatly increases the number of shares in the 
network. Clearly, the more number of shares, the 
higher is the probability for attackers to compromise 
more than t  shares.  
Let p  be the probability of one node being 
compromised, fp  be the probability of a CA secret 
being compromised in the fully distributed CA model 
in [5], and N  be the total number of nodes in the 
network. Then  
{ , (1, )} (1 )       (1)
N
i i N i
f N
i t
p p K t K N C p p −
=
= ≥ ∈ = −?
Given t , since fp  is monotone increasing with 
N , it is shown in Equation (1) that a larger system is 
more prone to attacks. Therefore, the approach in [5] 
is not desirable for large networks.  
In our work, the number of CAs is much smaller, 
and thus it will have better security than [5]. Let pp
be the probability of the secret being compromised in 
our partially distributed CA model. There is 
'{ , (1, )} (1 )       (2)
n
i i n i
p n
i t
p p K t K n C p p −
=
= ≥ ∈ = −?
Obviously, pp  will be much smaller than pp  since 
n N? .
D. Comparison
In this section, we compare our work with the other 
related work. To provide CA services, there are two 
extreme cases. One is the traditional centralized CA, 
and the other is the fully distributed case [5] in which 
every node in the network is a CA. Our method can be 
categorized as partially distributed in the sense that 
only some of the nodes hold the shares. In following 
Table 2, we summarize the performance comparison of 
these three strategies. 
Schemes 
Metrics 
Centralized 
CA 
Partially 
distributed 
CA 
Fully 
distributed 
CA 
Communication 
overhead 
high medium low 
Service response 
time 
long quick quick 
CA service 
Availability 
low high high 
Number of share-
holding nodes 
1 n N (much 
larger 
than n) 
Single point of 
failure 
yes no no 
Ease to locate 
enough CA 
nodes for attack 
difficult not easy easy 
Table 2: Comparison of the centralized, 
partially and fully distributed CA 
6. SIMULATION RESULTS
A.Simulation Setup 
We use NS2 as the simulation tool. IEEE 802.11 
MAC is adopted, and the radio transmission range is 
250 m. We simulate an ad hoc network with 60 nodes, 
among which 20 are CA nodes. The nodes are 
uniformly distributed within an area of 600m by 
600m. The node movement follows the widely used 
mobility model implemented in the CMU Monarch 
extension. We simulate two maximal moving speeds, 
1 m/s and 5 m/s, and the nodes have zero pause time.  
We implement the distributed clustering scheme 
in [6] to form one-hop non-overlapping clusters. Since 
the cluster head selection rule in [6] is based on the 
smallest ID, we modify the selection rule so that the 
cluster head is a CA whenever possible.  
In the simulation, we investigate the probability of 
locating enough CAs in a cluster and its neighbors. It 
can be expected that when a cluster contains enough 
CA nodes, the CA locating time is almost negligible, 
since the node information is contained in the 
response from the CH node. When the CAs in the 
directed neighbors need to be involved, the system 
response time is still short, because the requesting 
node only need to contact the CHs in the neighboring 
clusters. Therefore, we focus on investigating the CA 
distribution within one cluster and its neighbors.  
B.CA Distribution within One Cluster 
We first investigate the per node probability of the 
number of CAs within a cluster. In the simulation, we 
track a particular node and count the number of CAs 
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within its cluster at a snapshot of the network, based 
on which the per node probability is calculated.  
In Figure 1, we plot the per node probability mass 
functions (pmf) of the number of CA nodes within a 
cluster when nodes are traveling at speeds of 1 m/s 
and 5 m/s. It should be noted that we use curves in the 
following figures only for the purpose of illustration. 
In fact, the number of CAs is a discrete value. As we 
can observe, the probability mass functions are similar 
for different mobile speeds, and this is expected. Since 
nodes are moving randomly, the node distribution 
(including CA nodes) is still uniform and is not 
affected by the mobile speed.  
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Figure 1: Probability mass functions of the number 
of CAs in a cluster.  
In Figure 2, we show the probability that the 
number of CA in a cluster is greater than or equal to 
the CA threshold t . Obviously, when t  is a small 
number such as 2 or 3, there is a high probability that 
the CA service can be performed within the cluster. 
Even when t  is 4, the probability is still as high as 
0.5.
On the other hand, the probability decays fast 
when t  is greater than 4. Therefore, it is necessary to 
balance between t  and the number of CAs. From our 
experiment, we find there are on the average 4 CAs 
within the cluster for a particular node, and the 
probability for t  no greater than 4 is about 0.5. 
Therefore, as a rule of thumb, we may select t  to be 
smaller than the average number of CAs in a cluster, 
and the chance of finding enough CAs within the 
cluster should be higher than 0.5. Of course, the 
selection of t  also depends on the desired security 
level. Obviously, the selection of t  is a tradeoff 
between service availability and security level. 
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Figure 2: Probability of the number of CAs in a 
cluster greater than or equal to the CA threshold 
t .
C.CA in Neighboring Clusters 
Here we study the per node probability of the number 
of CA in a cluster plus neighboring clusters.  
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Figure 3: Probability of the number of CAs in a 
cluster and its neighbors greater than or equal to 
t .
In Figure 3, we present the probability that the 
total number of CAs in a cluster and its neighbors is 
greater than or equal to t , when node speeds are 1 m/s 
and 5 m/s. Again, there is slight difference between 
curves of the two speeds. This is because the number 
of clusters as well as node and CA distribution are not 
affected by the mobile speed.  
Most importantly, we notice that the probability is 
high even for relatively large value of t . For example, 
when t  is as high as 10, the probability for a cluster 
and its neighbors to have more than 10 CA nodes is 
still above 0.7. When t  is moderate or small, the 
probability is even higher. For example, when t  is 4, 
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the probability is above 0.95; when  t  is 6, the 
probability is still above 0.9. Therefore, for a 
moderate t , the probability for a search beyond 
neighboring clusters is rather low.  
From the above simulation results, we observe 
that our protocol is able to achieve high availability of 
local CA service, i.e., within the same cluster and its 
direct neighbors. Obviously, this high availability of 
local service will translate into prompt system 
response time for CA services.  
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we establish a cluster-based architecture 
to realize CA service in MANET. Our CH-assisted 
CA locating scheme shifts the responsibility of CA 
discovery from each user node to CHs. In this way, 
distributed CA information is managed only among 
the CHs, which greatly reduces service response time 
and system overhead. We also propose a share update 
procedure, which can resolve the multiple 
initializations problem and achieves fast system-wide 
update. Through simulation, we show that for a 
moderate CA threshold, there is a high probability to 
find enough CAs nodes within a cluster or in 
neighboring clusters. Consequently, system response 
time can be significantly improved. We also find node 
mobility has little influence on the availability of 
service.  
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